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I’M A LITTLE TREEPOT: CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY AND 
AFFORDING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION TO USEFUL ARTICLES 
Sonja Wolf Sahlsten* 
Abstract 
To determine if a useful article—generally ineligible for copyright 
protection—has pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that are 
copyrightable, the Copyright Act and the legislative intent expressed 
through the Act’s legislative history require that those artistic features 
be identified separately and capable of existing independently of the 
utilitarian function of the work. If the artistic features are either 
physically or conceptually separable from the utilitarian function of the 
work, then they are copyrightable. However, determining if artistic 
features are conceptually separable from the utilitarian function of the 
work has proven to be extremely difficult.  
Since Mazer v. Stein, the U.S. Supreme Court’s only decision in this 
area, courts and scholars have created more than eight different tests for 
conceptual separability. Some of these tests are entirely inconsistent 
with the Copyright Act and its purpose; others are overly abstract or 
difficult to apply; still others require judges to make subjective 
determinations of artistic worth. As a result, one court may find a work 
copyrightable, and another court may find the same work 
uncopyrightable depending on the test applied.  
To address these and other problems facing those seeking copyright 
protection for artistic features of useful articles, this Note proposes a 
test for conceptual separability that is based on an ordinary, reasonable 
observer standard and that provides factors to guide the fact-finder’s 
inquiry. This Note’s proposed test for conceptual separability is whether 
an ordinary, reasonable observer can perceive aesthetic features separate 
from the article’s utilitarian function. In performing this analysis, the 
factors that the fact-finder may consider fall into three main categories: 
(1) objective indicia of public perception; (2) use of the work separate 
from function; and (3) marketability information. This suggested test is 
consistent with the Copyright Act, simplifies conceptual separability 
analysis, and provides much needed clarity for copyrightability in the 
area of useful articles.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“Of the many fine lines that run through the Copyright Act, none is 
more troublesome than the line between protectible pictorial, graphic 
and sculptural works and unprotectible utilitarian elements of useful 
articles.”1 The Copyright Act affords copyright protection to pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works,2 but expressly denies copyright 
protection to any mechanical or utilitarian aspects of these works.3 To 
illustrate the difficulty of drawing this troublesome line, consider the 
following three works and their potential for obtaining copyright 
protection. First, envision an intricate tabletop sculpture of a tree. The 
handmade, ceramic tree sculpture has a hollow trunk, intertwining 
branches, and detailed bark. Second, imagine an ordinary ceramic 
teapot. Intuition and the law would conclude that the tree sculpture is 
copyrightable and that the simple ceramic teapot is not. Now, consider a 
third work—the same tree sculpture except that one of the branches is 
now a handle and another is now the spout for a teapot that holds liquid 
in the trunk. How does one determine if the tree teapot, or “treepot,” is 
copyrightable? Should copyright protection be unavailable for the work 
because it is a useful article, or is there something about the work that 
should be protectable? If a competitor made an exact replica of the 
treepot and sold it in the same market at a lower price, would the 
original artist have any recourse?  
The Copyright Act stipulates that for the treepot to be copyrightable, 
it must have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features “that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, 
the utilitarian” tea-holding “aspects of the article.”4 The legislative 
history of the Copyright Act adds that artistic elements that are 
physically or conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the 
article are eligible for copyright protection.5 Therefore, since the 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3 (3d ed. 2005). 
 2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–02 (2012). 
 3. Id. Mechanical and utilitarian creations fall under the ambit of patent law and are 
entitled to patent protection if they meet the requirements of utility, novelty, and non-
obviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03. Although a utility patent offers robust protection for the 
utilitarain function of a work, a utility patent will not cover aesthetic features of that work. See 
id. § 101. Design patents are more likely to provide some protection for aesthetically pleasing 
useful articles because design patents are issued for “new, original and ornamental design[s]” of 
articles of manufacture. Id. § 171. However, to receive a design patent, the design must be 
“primarily ornamental” and not dictated primarily by functional considerations. See L.A. Gear, 
Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). Thus, if 
functional considerations largely or entirely dictate the overall design of the work, as with many 
useful articles, then it will not receive design patent protection. See id. Consequently, copyright 
protection often represents the best protection for artistic features of useful articles.  
 4. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–02. 
 5. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976). 
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treepot’s sculptural features cannot be physically separated from the 
work, the copyrightability of the treepot turns on whether its artistic 
sculptural elements are conceptually separable from its utilitarian 
function. Unfortunately, courts and scholars have advanced more than 
eight inconsistent tests for conceptual separability, ranging from tests 
that egregiously violate the intention and focus of the Copyright Act to 
tests that are too abstract or impractical to apply. As a result, one court 
may find the sculptural aspects of the treepot copyrightable, but another 
may not, depending on which test the court applies. 
Part I of this Note focuses on copyright protection for useful articles 
before the 1976 Copyright Act by examining the evolution of earlier 
versions of the Copyright Act, the contributions of Copyright Office 
regulations, and the role of the U.S. Supreme Court. Part II explores the 
codification of the conceptual separability standard in the 1976 
Copyright Act and that Act’s legislative history.  
Part III discusses the various tests for conceptual separability 
developed and modified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, the most active Circuit in the area of conceptual separability. 
Part IV focuses on the additional tests for conceptual separability that 
legal scholars and courts outside of the Second Circuit have created. In 
both Parts III and IV, each test is thoroughly discussed, analyzed, and 
critiqued based on its consistency with the Copyright Act, its legislative 
intent, and general concepts of copyright law.  
Part V explains how each of the existing tests for conceptual 
separability either strays from the Copyright Act by misapplying 
conceptual separability, creates confusion by omitting guidance on how 
to apply the test, or both. With the Supreme Court silent in this area 
since 1954, the state of conceptual separability analysis is in need of 
reexamination and simplification. Part VI of this Note proposes a test 
for conceptual separability that is based on an ordinary, reasonable 
observer standard and that gives the fact-finder factors to guide the 
inquiry. The proposed test for conceptual separability is whether an 
ordinary, reasonable observer can perceive aesthetic features separate 
from the article’s function. In this analysis, the factors that the fact-
finder may consider fall into three main categories: (1) objective indicia 
of public perception; (2) use of the work separate from function; and (3) 
marketability information. The proposed test is consistent with the 
Copyright Act, simplifies conceptual separability analysis, and clarifies 
copyrightability in the area of useful articles.  
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I.  COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR USEFUL ARTICLES BEFORE THE 
1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 
By 1909, after a series of amendments to the Copyright Act, 
Congress eliminated the old “fine arts” requirement and paved the way 
for granting copyright protection to useful articles.6 However, the 
Copyright Office, which writes regulations interpreting the Copyright 
Act, was reluctant to abandon the “fine arts” limitation and did not 
eliminate it until 1948.7 Soon after, the Supreme Court considered the 
issue of copyrightability of useful articles in Mazer v. Stein8 and 
determined that an otherwise copyrightable work does not lose its 
copyright protection if incorporated into a useful article.9 The Copyright 
Office responded to this ruling and created the separability standard in 
its next round of regulations.10   
A.  The Copyright Act—Broadening the Scope of Copyright 
Protection 
The ambiguity surrounding the copyrightability of useful articles 
began with a series of additions to copyrightable subject matter in the 
Copyright Act. The first Copyright Act, enacted in 1790, allowed 
copyright protection for maps, books, and charts.11 In 1802, Congress 
extended coverage to “historical or other print[s],”12 and it afforded 
photographs protection in 1865.13 Congress gave three-dimensional 
statues and models or designs “intended to be perfected and executed as 
a work of the fine arts” protection in 1870—the first time it extended 
copyright protection beyond two-dimensional works.14 Although 
recognizing copyright protection for three-dimensional objects opened 
the door for copyright protection of useful articles,15 the 1870 
amendment’s emphasis on “fine arts” allowed the door to open no more 
than a crack.  
The 1909 Copyright Act eliminated the “fine arts” language and 
broadened the scope of copyright protection to include all “[w]orks of 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (amended 1976). 
 7. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949). 
 8. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 9. Id. at 218. 
 10. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960).  
 11. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–
805 (2012)).  
 12. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 1831).  
 13. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540, 540 (repealed 1870).  
 14. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 214 (repealed 1909).  
 15. Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful 
Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 339, 341–42 (1990). 
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art; models or design for works of art.”16 With this amendment, 
Congress broadened copyright beyond the purely aesthetic and formally 
allowed protection for useful articles.17 Even though nothing in the 1909 
Copyright Act barred protection for useful articles, the Copyright 
Office18 quickly issued regulations to exclude useful articles from 
copyright protection and to reestablish the “fine arts” limitation 
explicitly abandoned by Congress in the 1909 Copyright Act. 
B.  Copyright Office Regulations—The Slow Death of the “Fine 
Arts” Limitation 
In 1910, the Copyright Office issued regulations that defined “works 
of art” as “all works belonging fairly to the so-called fine arts.”19 The 
regulations also expressly prohibited copyright protection for 
“[p]roductions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and character” 
despite the presence of artistic designs or features.20 These regulations 
narrowed the scope of the Copyright Act by reintroducing the “fine 
arts” limitation that Congress had just removed in the 1909 Act.21 
However, while the 1910 regulations were in effect, the Copyright 
Office allowed registration of utilitarian objects such as candlesticks, 
inkstands, ashtrays, clocks, and saltshakers,22 but none of these 
registrations were compliant with the Copyright Office’s rigid 
traditional “fine arts” standard.23  
Possibly recognizing that courts were not applying its 1910 
regulations, or that the regulations were impracticable to apply, the 
Copyright Office amended the regulations in 1917 to allow copyright 
protection for “artistic drawings notwithstanding they may afterwards 
be utilized for articles of manufacture.”24 Although the Copyright 
Office moved a step closer to the broader language of the Copyright 
Act, it was not until 1948 that the Copyright Office officially abandoned 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (amended 1976). 
 17. Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 342.  
 18. The Copyright Office and its director, the Register of Copyrights, are responsible for 
all administrative functions and duties under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2012). The 
Register of Copyrights is also authorized to establish regulations consistent with the Copyright 
Act. Id. § 702.  
 19. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BULL. NO. 15, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION 
OF CLAIMS TO COPYRIGHT 8 (1910).  
 20. Id. 
 21. See id.  
 22. Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 342 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 221 (1954) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).  
 23. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 19, at 8. 
 24. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BULL. NO. 15, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION 
OF CLAIMS TO COPYRIGHT 9 (1917).  
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the “fine arts” limitation.25 In its new regulation, the Copyright Office 
defined “[w]orks of art” as “works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as 
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, 
such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as all 
works belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings, and 
sculpture.”26 With this regulation, nearly forty years after Congress 
eliminated the “fine arts” requirement with the 1909 Act,27 the 
Copyright Office finally removed the “fine arts” limitation and ceased 
its efforts to confine copyright protection in this area.  
C.  The Supreme Court Addresses Copyright of Artistic Designs in 
Useful Articles 
In 1954, the Supreme Court made its first and, to this date, only 
venture into the statutory and administrative fold of copyright protection 
for useful articles in Mazer v. Stein.28 The works at issue in Mazer were 
china statuettes of male and female dancers for use as lamp bases in 
conjunction with lampshades, electrical wiring, and sockets.29 The 
plaintiff who manufactured the lamp submitted the statuettes, without 
the other lamp components attached, to the Copyright Office for 
registration as “works of art,” and was granted certificates of copyright 
registration.30 Although the manufacturer sold a negligible number of 
statuettes without the lamp components, the overwhelming majority of 
the manufacturer’s profits were from sales of the statuette in the 
functional lamp assembly.31 The plaintiff brought suit against 
competing manufacturers who copied the statuettes without permission 
and sold their own lamps featuring the copied statuettes.32 
The Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: “Can statuettes be 
protected . . . when the copyright applicant intended primarily to use the 
statuettes in the form of lamp bases . . . ?”33 In holding that the 
statuettes were copyrightable, the Court looked to the evolution of the 
Copyright Act, the legislative history of the 1909 Act, and the 
Copyright Office regulations as confirmation that the change in scope 
from “works of the fine arts” to “works of art” was intended to allow 
copyright protection for works of this nature.34 The Court endorsed the 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949).  
 26. Id. 
 27. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (current version at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102 (2012)). 
 28. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 29. Id. at 202.  
 30. Id. at 202–03. 
 31. Id. at 203. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 204–05.  
 34. Id. at 213–14. 
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move away from the “fine arts” limitation and cautioned that 
“[i]ndividual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit 
a narrow or rigid concept of art.”35 Finally, the Court determined that 
there was “nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that 
the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright 
bars or invalidates its registration.”36 
In Mazer, the Supreme Court established that an otherwise 
copyrightable work does not lose its protection when incorporated into a 
useful article.37 However, the Court did not offer guidance on how to 
determine when and what elements of useful articles are 
copyrightable.38 The task of providing this guidance, taken on by the 
lower courts and the Copyright Office, has generated inconsistent 
regulations, tests, standards, and decisions.  
D.  Copyright Office Regulations Post-Mazer—Origins of the 
Separability Standard 
In 1960, the Copyright Office authored a regulation to comply with 
its understanding of the new Supreme Court precedent in Mazer while 
still intending to exclude the broad realm of industrial design from 
copyright protection.39 This 1960 regulation contained limitations not 
found in the Mazer opinion:  
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility the 
fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped will 
not qualify it as a work of art. However if the shape of a 
utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic 
sculpture, carving or pictorial representation which can be 
identified separately and are capable of existing 
independently as a work of art, such features will be 
eligible for registration.40  
This regulation, which established what came to be known as the 
separability standard, introduced new complexities into the increasingly 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See id. at 214. 
 36. Id. at 218. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id.  
 39. After Mazer, the Copyright Office consistently maintianed that copyright protection 
was innapropriate for the overall design of industrial products. See Robert C. Denicola, Applied 
Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. 
REV. 707, 715, 717 (1983). The typical argument against extending copyright protection to 
industrial design is that doing so would remove the design from the public domain and confer a 
monopoly to the manufacturer. See id. at 722. According to opponents of copyright protection 
for industrial design, this type of monopoly, and the competitive advantage it provides, should 
only be afforded to patent holders. See id. at 722 & n.84. 
 40. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960) (emphasis added).  
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unclear area of copyright protection for useful articles. First, this 
regulation required a determination of the “sole intrinsic function” of an 
article41—an inquiry entirely created by the Copyright Office and 
addressed by neither the Copyright Act nor the Supreme Court.42  
Most importantly, the regulation went beyond the holding of 
Mazer—that otherwise copyrightable works do not lose protection if 
incorporated into a useful article43—and articulated a specific standard 
to determine when an artistic feature of a useful article may be eligible 
for copyright protection.44 This new regulation would afford copyright 
protection to artistic features of useful articles that could be “identified 
separately and [were] capable of existing independently” of the article’s 
utilitarian function.45 However, the regulation did not define “identified 
separately” or “existing independently,” nor did it offer guidance on 
how to make these factual determinations.46  
II.  CODIFYING THE SEPARABILITY STANDARD FOR 
COPYRIGHTABILITY OF USEFUL ARTICLES: THE 1976 COPYRIGHT 
ACT AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Congress formally codified the Copyright Office’s regulations 
setting out the separability standard in the 1976 Copyright Act.47 The 
path to its codification warrants an examination of the Act’s legislative 
history and the intent of the Congress that passed the 1976 Copyright 
Act. At the request of Congress in the late 1950s, the Copyright Office 
assessed the state of copyright law in preparation for comprehensive 
reform of the 1909 Copyright Act.48 In 1961, the Register of Copyrights 
reported the findings of the Copyright Office to Congress.49 On the 
topic of copyright of useful articles, the Register acknowledged Mazer’s 
approval of copyright protection for works of art incorporated in useful 
articles but cautioned against “extend[ing] the copyright law to 
industrial design[].”50 Instead of using copyright law, the Register 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id.  
 42. Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 346; see Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 
1077 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)); Mazer, 347 U.S. 201.  
 43. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218. 
 44. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c). 
 45. Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 346 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c)). 
 46. See id. at 346.  
 47. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
 48. See Denicola, supra note 39, at 717–18.  
 49. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 14–15 (Comm. Print 
1961) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS]. 
 50. Id. at 13. See supra note 39 for an explanation of the Copyright Office’s opposition to 
expanding copyright protection to industrial design.  
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proposed enacting separate industrial design legislation that would grant 
the design of useful articles sui generis protection.51  
The Senate’s design protection effort based on the Register’s 
recommendations appeared in Title II of the general copyright revision 
bill and provided protection for the “original ornamental design of a 
useful article”52 but excluded designs “dictated solely by a utilitarian 
function of the article.”53 Title II, known as the Design Protection Act 
of 1975,54 passed the Senate but not the House.55 The House rejected 
Title II, in part, because the sui generis protection it granted “could not 
truly be considered copyright protection and therefore appropriately 
within the scope of copyright revision.”56  
Upon rejecting the Copyright Office’s suggested sui generis 
protection approach to useful articles, Congress codified the Copyright 
Office’s existing regulations, including its separability standard, in the 
1976 Copyright Act.57 This Act, as amended, is the current copyright 
law of the United States.58 Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act affords 
copyright protection to categories of “works of authorship,” including 
“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”59 By replacing the “works of 
art” classification of the 1909 Copyright Act with the “pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works” category, Congress sought to end 
copyright’s typical association with the fine arts.60 Section 101, which 
defines “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,” states:  
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship 
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian 
aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as 
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent 
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, 
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.61 
With this definition, Congress formally adopted the Copyright 
Office’s regulations of the 1950s and 1960s granting protection to 
                                                                                                                     
 51. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 49, at 13, 16.  
 52. 122 CONG. REC. S3856–59 (1976) (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1976).  
 53. Id. at 3856–57 (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. at 3859.  
 55. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 50 (1976). 
 56. Id. 
 57. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).  
 58. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2012).   
 59. Id. § 102(a)(5). 
 60. Id. § 101.  
 61. Id. § 101 (emphasis added).  
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elements of useful articles capable of being “identified separately” from 
and “existing independently” of the useful article.62 The 1976 Copyright 
Act’s most significant deviation from the Copyright Office’s regulations 
relates to the definition of “useful article.” Section 101 of the 1976 
Copyright Act defines “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function,”63 and deletes the word “sole” contained in the 
Copyright Office regulation.64 This change broadens the scope of useful 
articles from works that have exclusive utilitarian function to works that 
have any utilitarian function, thereby narrowing the scope of copyright 
protection by subjecting more works to the separability standard.65  
Although the Copyright Act defines neither “identified separately” 
nor “existing independently,”66 the legislative history of the Copyright 
Act provides some guidance on what these terms, which the Copyright 
Office created but never defined,67 may mean. For example, Congress 
clarified that two-dimensional paintings and three-dimensional statues 
incorporated into useful articles can still exist independently as works of 
art and, therefore, do not lose their copyright protection.68 However, the 
Legislature made clear that it intended to exclude industrial design from 
protection regardless of any aesthetically pleasing features.69 The House 
Report articulated this intent as follows:  
On the other hand, although the shape of an industrial 
product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the 
Committee’s intention is not to offer it copyright protection 
under the bill. Unless the shape of an . . . industrial product 
contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can 
be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that 
article, the design would not be copyrighted under the 
bill.70  
The most significant contribution of this report was the prospect that 
an element not physically separable, but merely conceptually separable 
                                                                                                                     
 62. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960). 
 63. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
 64. Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 350 (noting the difference between the 1976 Copyright 
Act and the language found in 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960)). Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A 
‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray 
the appearance of the article or to convey information.” (emphasis added)), with 37 C.F.R. 
§ 202.10(c) (“If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility the fact that the article is 
unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art.” (emphasis added)).  
 65. Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 350. 
 66. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 67. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.  
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976).  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
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from the useful article, could be copyrightable.71 This language about 
conceptual separability has spawned different interpretations of the 
separability standard and led to the development of a multitude of tests 
across the Circuit Courts of Appeal and among legal scholars.  
III.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT—CREATING TESTS FOR CONCEPTUAL 
SEPARABILITY AND EVOLVING TO THE BRANDIR TEST 
The Second Circuit has been the most active in interpreting the 
statutory language and legislative intent of the separability standard in 
the 1976 Copyright Act.72 In the process, the Second Circuit has 
created, modified, and recreated tests for conceptual separability.73 
What follows is an explanation of the evolution to the Brandir test, the 
Second Circuit’s current standard and a leading test for conceptual 
separability. Although some of the Second Circuit’s early separability 
analysis was fairly consistent with the Copyright Act and its legislative 
intent, the Circuit’s current approach to conceptual separability is a 
process-based test that improperly focuses on the designer’s motivation, 
intent, and process rather than on the final work as the Copyright Act 
and its legislative intent require. The test for conceptual separability that 
this Note proposes is devoid of any process-based determinations and 
properly focuses the conceptual separability analysis on the work and its 
features.  
A.  Kieselstein-Cord: The “Primary” Versus “Subsidiary” 
Standard 
In 1980, the Second Circuit first took up the issue of separability 
under the 1976 Copyright Act in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by 
Pearl, Inc., holding that two decorative belt buckles were 
copyrightable.74 The belt buckles at issue were not ordinary buckles 
confined to the purpose of securing pants around the wearer’s waist; 
rather, they were sculpted designs made of precious metals that wearers 
displayed as ornamental jewelry separate from the belt.75 The 
manufacturer registered the buckles with the Copyright Office as 
“jewelry,” but the certificate that the Copyright Office issued listed the 
buckles as “original sculpture and design.”76  
                                                                                                                     
 71. Id.  
 72. See, e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 
1987); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985); Kieselstein-Cord 
v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 73. See, e.g., Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1144; Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418; Kieselstein-Cord, 632 
F.2d at 993. 
 74. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993. 
 75. Id. at 990. 
 76. Id. at 990–91.  
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In subsequent infringement litigation, a manufacturer selling copies 
of the belt buckles argued that the buckles could not be protected by 
copyright because they were useful articles without any features that 
could be identified separately from, or capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the buckles.77 The district 
court agreed and held that the copyrights were invalid because they 
“fail[ed] to satisfy the test of separability and independent existence of 
the artistic features.”78 
At issue before the Second Circuit was whether the buckles were 
copyrightable.79 The court acknowledged that the task of determining 
when a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature “can be identified 
separately from, and [is] capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article”80 is difficult because either physical or 
conceptual separability can satisfy the separability requirement.81 In 
response to the defendant’s argument that physical separability is 
required and conceptual separability is insufficient, the court stated that 
such an interpretation “flies in the face of the legislative intent” that 
specifically allows physical or conceptual separability to satisfy the 
standard.82 
In holding that the belt buckles had conceptually separable sculptural 
elements, the court was influenced by evidence that the buckle wearers 
used the buckles for ornamentation on parts of the body other than the 
waist.83 The court continued that, “[t]he primary ornamental aspect of 
the . . . buckles is conceptually separable from their subsidiary 
utilitarian function.”84 Thus, the Kieselstein-Cord standard that 
developed is also known as the “primary/subsidiary test for conceptual 
separability.”85 
The Second Circuit created this “primary ornamental aspect” and 
“subsidiary utilitarian function” language as a test for conceptual 
separability but did not define the terms in the opinion.86 The primary 
versus subsidiary distinction was also not founded in the Copyright Act 
or its legislative history.87 Moreover, courts and commentators have 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Id. at 991–92.  
 78. Id. at 991 (alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980)).  
 79. Id. 
 80. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 81. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976)). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Barton R. Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate Surrounding Conceptual 
Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 123 (2008); see Kieselstein-
Cord, 632 F.2d at 993. 
 86. See Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993. 
 87. See Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 359.  
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criticized the standard for failing to provide guidance on how to make 
the primary versus subsidiary determination and for leaving many other 
questions unanswered, including how to determine which aspects are 
primary or subsidiary and how much the ornamental aspect must 
dominate the utilitarian function to be conceptually separable.88  
This Note advances a test that incorporates a portion of the 
primary/subsidiary test in its second factor. This factor, which considers 
the use of the work separate from function, allows inquiry into the 
extent that any ornamental aspects of the work are prominent enough to 
create an alternate use of the work exclusively as art. This factor of the 
proposed test provides a list of relevant indications that the work has an 
alternate use as art and, therefore, avoids some of the criticism facing 
the vague Kieselstein-Cord test.  
B.  Barnhart: The “Wholly Unnecessary” and “Inextricably 
Intertwined” Standards  
The Second Circuit had a chance to revisit copyright protection for 
artistic features of useful articles five years after Kieselstein-Cord in 
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., where the court, applying 
a variation of its own conceptual separability test, found that four 
mannequins of partial human torsos used for displaying clothing were 
not copyrightable.89 The mannequins at issue, created by plaintiff 
Barnhart, were two female and two male life-size torsos—one of each 
nude and one of each clothed with a shirt.90 Barnhart applied for 
copyright registration of the pieces as “sculptures,” and the Copyright 
Office approved the application.91 In an action for copyright 
infringement against a manufacturer of substantially similar 
mannequins, the district court determined that the Barnhart mannequins 
had no aesthetic features that could exist physically or conceptually 
separate from the mannequins as useful articles and were, therefore, not 
copyrightable.92  
                                                                                                                     
 88. See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 421 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (criticizing the “primary” versus “subsidiary” standard for not 
providing enough guidance to the trier of fact to determine what constitutes the “primary 
ornamental aspect” and the “subsidiary utilitarian function”); Thomas M. Byron, As Long as 
There’s Another Way: Pivot Point v. Charlene Products as an Accidental Template for a 
Creativity-Driven Useful Articles Analysis, 49 IDEA 147, 179 (2008) (further explaining how 
the test allows judges to insert their artistic judgment into the analysis in direct opposition to the 
mandate keeping judges out of the role of art critic); Keyes, supra note 85, at 123–24 
(suggesting that the test’s lack of detail would allow judges to use their own personal biases 
regarding art in the conceptual separability analysis); Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 359 (pointing 
out a number of questions the court left unanswered, including the hypothetical situation where 
the ornamental and utilitarian aspects are equal). 
 89. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418 (majority opinion). 
 90. Id. at 412.  
 91. Id. at 413.   
 92. Id. at 414.  
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On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that since the mannequins were 
concededly useful articles, the remaining copyrightability issue was 
whether they possessed aesthetic or artistic features that were physically 
or conceptually separable from their utilitarian function.93 Instead of 
applying the “primary” versus “subsidiary” standard that it created in 
Kieselstein-Cord,94 the court quoted the “primary” and “subsidiary” 
language in passing95 and simply concluded that the artistic features 
were both physically and conceptually inseparable from the utilitarian 
purpose of displaying clothing.96 The court explained the distinction 
between the belt buckles in Kieselstein-Cord and the mannequins in 
Barnhart as follows: 
[T]he ornamented surfaces of the buckles were not in any 
respect required by their utilitarian functions; the artistic 
and aesthetic features could thus be conceived of as having 
been added to, or superimposed upon, an otherwise 
utilitarian article. The unique artistic design was wholly 
unnecessary to performance of the utilitarian function. In 
the case of the Barnhart forms, on the other hand, the 
features claimed to be aesthetic or artistic . . . are 
inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the 
display of clothes.”97 
Although briefly quoting Kieselstein-Cord, the Second Circuit 
actually articulated a new, more stringent standard by requiring that the 
artistic elements be “wholly unnecessary” to the utilitarian function of 
the article.98 Commentators have characterized this as an objective test99 
that finds conceptual separability if the article’s utilitarian function does 
not require the aesthetic features of a useful article.100 Conversely, if the 
function of the article mandates the artistic and aesthetic features, the 
features are neither conceptually separable nor copyrightable.101 Some 
scholars have praised the test for being objective enough to reduce 
opportunities for judges to inject their ideas and opinions of art into the 
conceptual separability analysis.102  
 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Id.  
 94. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.  
 95. See Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419. 
 96. Id. at 418.  
 97. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).  
 98. Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 362. 
 99. See Keyes, supra note 85, at 138. 
 100. See id. (citing Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419). 
 101. See id. at 125 (citing Nathan C. Rogers, Copyright Protection: A Dead Fish for 
Sculptors of Taxidermy Mannequins?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 159, 167 (1998)).  
 102. See, e.g., Keyes, supra note 85, at 138. 
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However, this new standard, like the one it modified, is not defined 
or established in the Copyright Act or the Act’s legislative history.103 
Furthermore, “inextricably intertwined” is new language without 
precedent, and the Barnhart decision provides no guidance on how to 
determine when function dictates an artistic feature of a useful article.104 
The test does not allow for consideration of how much, or in what ways, 
function dictates the artistic features.105 By not allowing for this type of 
quantitative or qualitative consideration, the court determined that if 
function requires a design element at all, it is not conceptually separable 
and, therefore, not copyrightable.106 Some judges and scholars have also 
criticized the test for being a test of physical separability rather than 
conceptual separability.107 “Inextricably intertwined” is too high of a 
hurdle for copyrightability because artistic features will most likely only 
escape inextricable intertwinement with the useful functions if they are 
physically separable as well.108  
The test this Note proposes focuses on an ordinary observer’s 
perception of the work. It utilizes a standard that is truly one of 
conceptual separability and avoids unintentionally crossing the 
boundary to physical separability. It is also structured to avoid being 
more rigorous than the Copyright Act intended.  
C.  Judge Newman Dissenting in Barnhart: The Ordinary, 
Reasonable Beholder Standard 
Judge Jon Newman’s insightful dissent in Barnhart examined the 
meaning of conceptual separability, surveyed the various possible 
standards for determining conceptual separability, and proposed another 
new test.109 Judge Newman first pointed out what he declared to be “the 
obvious point” that conceptual separability must mean something other 
                                                                                                                     
 103. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976). 
 104. Keyes, supra note 85, at 138.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 425 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that the “inextricably intertwined” test is essentially a test of 
physical separability that ignores, or at least misapplies, conceptual separability); Brandir Int’l, 
Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1151 (2d Cir. 1987) (Winter, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Barnhart majority’s test is one of physical 
separability); Byron, supra note 88, at 175 (stating that the “inextricably intertwined” test is too 
similar to physical separability). But see Keyes, supra note 85, at 138 (reasoning that the test 
from Barnhart is different enough from physical separability to allow copyright protection in 
situations where physical separability is lacking). 
 108. See Byron, supra note 88, at 175; Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 362 (explaining that 
the “inextricably intertwined” standard almost always requires physical separability). 
 109. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 420–22 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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than physical separability.110 By extension, a feature could be 
conceptually separable from the utilitarian function of the useful article 
without being physically separable.111 Judge Newman’s principle 
disagreement with the majority’s “inextricably intertwined” standard 
was that it “misapplie[d], if it d[id] not ignore, the principle of 
conceptual separability” and essentially required physical 
separability.112  
Disappointed with the majority’s approach, Judge Newman 
examined a number of alternative standards to determine conceptual 
separability, the first of which was a test that would focus on the 
primary usage of the article.113 Under this standard, an article used 
primarily to serve its utilitarian function would not be considered 
conceptually separable even if the artistic elements of the article had a 
secondary use solely as a work of art.114 Judge Newman explained that 
the major flaw with a usage standard was that it would deny copyright 
protection to some works displayed and considered as art by a minority 
of consumers if a majority of consumers used the article for its 
utilitarian function.115  
Judge Newman next discussed the “primary” versus “subsidiary” 
standard from Kieselstein-Cord,116 which he characterized as being 
similar to the usage standard.117 Judge Newman criticized this test as 
providing the fact-finder with insufficient guidance to measure the 
“primary” and “subsidiary” classifications of a given article.118  
Judge Newman then considered the marketability approach 
advocated by Professor Melville Nimmer,119 discussed in Section IV.C. 
This approach argues that conceptual separability exists when there “is 
any substantial likelihood that even if the article had no utilitarian use it 
would still be marketable to some significant segment of the community 
simply because of its aesthetic qualities.”120 Judge Newman pointed out 
that the drawback of this standard, which Nimmer himself admitted, is 
that a majority of people may recognize some works as works of art, but 
only a few people, perhaps less than a “‘significant segment of the 
community,’” would be willing to purchase those works just for display 
                                                                                                                     
 110. Id. at 421. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 113. Id. at 421. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. 
 116. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 117. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 421 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 2.08[B][3] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2014)). 
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in their own homes rather than for their utilitarian function.121 Judge 
Newman recognized the inequity of using marketability of the work to 
determine copyrightability.122 
Finally, Judge Newman rejected the notion that conceptual 
separability exists when the design of a useful article is so aesthetically 
pleasing that it can be appreciated for its artistic qualities.123 As he 
accurately noted, Congress has affirmatively rejected this approach and 
requires that the artistic features be more than just recognized and 
appreciated; rather, they must be identified separately from and capable 
of existing independently of the useful article.124 
After surveying and rejecting four alternative approaches to 
conceptual separability, Judge Newman articulated his own test—
whether the article “stimulate[s] in the mind of the beholder a concept 
that is separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function.”125 
Judge Newman explained that, in making this determination, the fact-
finder should consider the perspective of the “ordinary, reasonable 
observer” as the relevant beholder for the inquiry.126 Therefore, 
conceptual separability exists, according to Judge Newman, when “the 
design creates in the mind of the ordinary observer two different 
concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously.”127  
Applying his own test, Judge Newman determined that the two nude 
mannequins would be unlikely to create the concept of a mannequin 
with the utilitarian function of displaying clothing in the mind of an 
observer; rather, an ordinary observer would conceive of the forms 
exclusively as sculptural art.128 As for the clothed mannequins, Judge 
Newman perceived a triable issue of fact regarding conceptual 
separability and would have remanded this issue for application of his 
test at trial.129 
Other courts aptly refer to Judge Newman’s test as the “temporal 
displacement test” because it adds a temporal component to the 
separability requirement.130 For a feature to be copyrightable, the 
beholder must be able to envision the artistic concept of the feature 
without simultaneously contemplating the utilitarian function.131 Judge 
                                                                                                                     
 121. Id. at 422. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 424. 
 129. Id. at 426. 
 130. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144 (2d Cir. 
1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 131. See Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422–23 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
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Newman provided a list of relevant considerations to assist a fact-finder 
in making this determination, including whether and to what extent the 
object has been displayed or used separately from its utilitarian 
purpose.132 Judge Newman further explained that expert testimony 
would generally be necessary to gather the requisite information for this 
inquiry.133  
Although Judge Newman provided some guidance on how to apply 
his test, the majority criticized his test for being “so ethereal as to 
amount to a ‘non-test’ that would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to administer or apply.”134 Some scholars have echoed the 
majority’s concerns about the complexity of applying Judge Newman’s 
temporal displacement test.135 They criticize the test for allowing 
judges’ personal conceptions of art to influence their separability 
analysis.136 Judge Newman’s test is probably more rigorous than the 
statutory conceptual separability requirement—that the artistic features 
“be identified separately”137—because the test requires that the artistic 
elements completely displace, at least temporarily, the utilitarian 
function in the mind of the ordinary observer.138  
Overall though, Judge Newman’s test has strong intuitive appeal—
copyright should protect works that an ordinary observer can perceive 
as works of art.139 Consistent with Mazer, under Judge Newman’s test, a 
work would not lose its copyright protection if incorporated into a 
useful article.140 Moreover, Judge Newman’s focus on the actual 
appearance of the useful article, rather than the designer’s process of 
making it, is consistent with the focus of the Copyright Act.141 Yet, 
despite its conceptual appeal and praise from scholars, courts have not 
adopted Judge Newman’s temporal displacement test.142 
                                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 423.  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 419 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 135. See Keyes, supra note 85, at 140 (“[T]he issue presented by Judge Newman’s test is 
so abstract that the ordinary reasonable person standard is not suitable.”); Perlmutter, supra note 
15, at 377 (stating that Judge Newman’s test “is more complex than necessary”). 
 136. See Keyes, supra note 85, at 140 (explaining that judges’ personal opinions about 
what constitutes art will inevitably influence their beliefs about whether an ordinary reasonable 
person would view the work in question as art). But see Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 376 
(acknowledging some risk of discrimination based on notions of conventional art, but explaining 
that this risk can be reduced by adopting guidelines that ask fact-finders to disregard their 
opinion of the artistic merit of the work).  
 137. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 138. See Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 377.  
 139. See id. at 375–76.  
 140. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). 
 141. See Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 375. 
 142. See Jacob Bishop, Note, Stealing Beauty: Pivot Point International v. Charlene 
Products and the Unfought Battle Between the Merger Doctrine and Conceptual Separability, 
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The test that this Note proposes incorporates and capitalizes on many 
of the positive aspects of Judge Newman’s test while avoiding its key 
shortcomings. Like Judge Newman’s test, the suggested test’s 
determinative inquiry is the perception of the ordinary, reasonable 
observer. The proposed test, borrowing from Judge Newman’s use of 
factors, provides three objective factors and identifies key 
determinations related to each. Most importantly, the proposed test does 
not require the complete temporal displacement that Judge Newman’s 
test mandates. In this way, the ordinary, reasonable observer standard of 
the proposed test more closely comports with the Copyright Act and 
maintains strong intuitive appeal.  
D.  The Brandir Test: The Designer’s Influence Standard 
In 1987, the Second Circuit again interpreted the meaning of 
conceptual separability and again modified its standard, incorporating 
themes from Professor Robert Denicola’s test that turns on “the extent 
to which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by functional 
considerations.”143 The article at issue in Brandir International, Inc. v. 
Cascade Pacific Lumber Co. was a bicycle rack made of bent tubing in 
the now-familiar sinusoidal wave shape.144 The designer of the bicycle 
rack originally constructed various sculptures made of continuous 
pieces of bent wire.145 The artist had no intention of building a bicycle 
rack until a bicycle-enthusiast friend suggested that one of the 
sculptures would be a great design for a bicycle rack that would allow 
bicycles to be parked and locked under the upper-loops and over the 
lower-loops.146 With that suggestion, the artist modified the design of 
the wire sculpture to optimize its use as a bicycle rack.147  
The Copyright Office refused registration and determined that the 
bicycle rack did not contain any element that was capable of existing 
independently as a copyrightable work apart from the overall shape of 
the useful article.148 In subsequent infringement litigation against a 
manufacturer making similar bicycle racks, the district court agreed that 
the bicycle rack did not have separable artistic elements and was, 
therefore, not entitled to copyright protection.149  
                                                                                                                     
2006 WIS. L. REV. 1067, 1085; Gayle Coleman, Comment, The Protection of Useful Articles 
and the Elusive Concept of Conceptual Separability: Brandir International Inc. v. Cascade 
Pacific Lumber Co., 13 NOVA L. REV. 1417, 1426 (1989).  
 143. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 144. Id. at 1143.  
 145. Id. at 1146. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1146–47. 
 148. Id. at 1146. 
 149. Id. at 1143. 
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The Second Circuit framed the issue of separability as a complicated 
one for which courts “have had difficulty framing tests by which the 
fine line establishing what is and what is not copyrightable can be 
drawn.”150 It emphasized that its own precedent created in Kieselstein-
Cord and Barnhart called for a conceptual separability analysis in 
determining copyrightability of useful articles.151 The court recognized 
that it had applied disparate tests in Kieselstein-Cord and Barnhart, but 
it characterized Barnhart as distinguishing Kieselstein-Cord rather than 
overruling it.152  
The court then turned its attention to an article written by Professor 
Denicola and suggested that it could help resolve the differences 
between the two precedents and the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Barnhart.153 Professor Denicola had suggested that the confusion 
regarding conceptual separability stemmed from an effort to draw a 
clear line between works of industrial design and artistic works 
incorporated into useful articles when there is really “no line, but 
merely a spectrum of forms and shapes responsive in varying degrees to 
utilitarian concerns.”154  
Then, in a turn away from its own previously articulated tests and 
standards, the court adopted Professor Denicola’s test for conceptual 
separability, which it rearticulated as follows: “[I]f design elements 
reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic 
aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the 
utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be 
identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised 
independently of functional influences, conceptual separability 
exists.”155 The court formed the Brandir test on the determination that it 
was consistent with the court’s decisions in Kieselstein-Cord and 
Barnhart, was easier to apply than the tests articulated in either of those 
cases, and avoided discrimination against abstract art.156 
Despite the Second Circuit’s confidence in creating the Brandir test, 
it was the subject of a vigorous dissent from Judge Ralph Winter.157 
Judge Winter criticized the majority for “diminish[ing] the statutory 
concept of ‘conceptual separability’ to the vanishing point.”158 Many 
elements of useful articles suggest, at least at some level, both artistic 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1144. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1145 (citing Denicola, supra note 39, at 741–42). 
 154. Id. (quoting Denicola, supra note 39, at 741). 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 1151 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 158. Id. 
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and functional considerations.159 The Brandir test would deny copyright 
protection to such elements for reflecting both considerations.160 Judge 
Winter preferred the ordinary, reasonable beholder test articulated in 
Judge Newman’s dissent in Barnhart.161 Notably though, Judge Winter 
did not quote or cite to Judge Newman’s language that requires 
complete temporal displacement of the artistic features from the 
utilitarian function.162 Rather, Judge Winter’s articulation merely 
requires that “an ordinary reasonable observer . . . perceive an aesthetic 
concept not related to the article’s use.”163 This is less rigorous than 
complete temporal displacement.  
Judge Winter also faulted the majority for allowing “copyright 
protection [to] depend upon largely fortuitous circumstances” by 
focusing on the process of creating the article.164 Judge Winter correctly 
criticized the Brandir test for improperly determining copyrightability 
based on the process of creating the work rather than on the result of the 
creative process—the final work itself.165 Most importantly, this focus is 
inconsistent with the Copyright Act, which explicitly places its focus on 
how the final article is perceived, not how it was created.166 
Additionally, some commentators have criticized the Brandir test for 
inviting judges to engage in subjective artistic judgment beyond their 
legal expertise.167 Professor Denicola, however, praises the process-
focused test for allowing judges to suspend their subjective notions of 
artistic merit and focus on the more objective process of how the artist 
created the work.168 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See Byron, supra note 88, at 177. 
 160. See id.; Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 373 (noting that denying copyright protection for 
dual-motivated works would be inconsistent with the spirit of Mazer). 
 161. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1151 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., 
dissenting)).  
 162. Id. (quoting Judge Newman’s dissent only for the requirement that the article 
“stimulate in the mind of the beholder a concept that is separate from the concept evoked by its 
utilitarian function” (quoting Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting))); Barnhart, 
773 F.2d at 423 (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing the requirement for a “temporal sense of 
separateness”). 
 163. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1151 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Coleman, supra note 142, at 1435. 
 166. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (making no reference to the process of creating the article, 
but rather inquiring whether the final article has “features that can be identified separately from, 
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article”); Brandir, 834 
F.2d at 1152 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Coleman, supra note 142, at 
1435; see also Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 374 (noting that in other areas of copyright law, 
including infringement and copyrightability of any other work, motive and intent are irrelevant). 
 167. See Matthew C. Broaddus, Comment, Designers Should Strive to Create “Useless” 
Products: Using the “Useful Article” Doctrine to Avoid Separability Analysis, 51 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 493, 507–10 (2009).  
 168. See Keyes, supra note 85, at 137. 
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Finally, the Brandir test is difficult to apply because it is 
fundamentally incompatible with the reality of the artistic design 
process. In most circumstances, the artistic design process does not 
follow a retraceable, step-by-step series of events and decisions that 
lead to the final design of an article.169 Rather, it is typical for artists and 
designers to create and reject multiple ideas before arriving at a final 
design. Even if it were possible to reconstruct an artist’s or designer’s 
creative process, it is unrealistic to expect a fact-finder to be able to 
determine whether the artistic features were significantly influenced by 
functional considerations.170 Although purportedly objective, the test 
requires the fact-finder to determine facts about the designer’s 
inherently subjective processes, motivations, and intentions.171 
Moreover, since the test turns on subjective factors such as the 
designer’s motivation and intent, problems of proof will likely exist 
when a designer, who has a personal stake in the ultimate determination 
of copyrightability, must testify to such matters.172  
 The Second Circuit’s current process-based test for conceptual 
separability, most recently articulated in Brandir, is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the Copyright Act and difficult to apply. Therefore, 
this Note’s proposed test for conceptual separability draws more from 
Judge Winter’s dissent and is exclusively focused on how the ordinary, 
reasonable observer views the final work and its features rather than the 
process of creating the work.  
IV.  OUTSIDE THE SECOND CIRCUIT—A MULTITUDE OF TESTS 
CREATED BY COURTS AND SCHOLARS  
Scholars and courts beyond the Second Circuit have taken different 
approaches to interpreting the Copyright Act’s separability standard. 
Based on these varying interpretations, they have promulgated different 
tests for conceptual separability. Though these tests attempt to facilitate 
the conceptual separability analysis and comport with the Copyright 
Act, they have all received criticism for falling short in critical ways. 
This Part analyzes and critiques the tests created by these courts and 
scholars with an eye toward their compliance with the separability 
standard of the Copyright Act and the fundamental principles of 
copyright law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 169. See Coleman, supra note 142, at 1435. 
 170. See id. at 1436; Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 374 (noting that a key difficulty for a 
fact-finder applying the Brandir test is determining the level of functional considerations present 
in the mind of the designer, which may vary throughout the design process). 
 171. Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 375.  
 172. Id. 
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A.  Professor Goldstein’s “Equally Useful” Test 
Professor Paul Goldstein set forth a test for conceptual separability 
that is very similar to the Second Circuit’s test in Barnhart.173 Under 
Goldstein’s test, a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature of a useful 
article is conceptually separable if “it can stand on its own as a work of 
art traditionally conceived, and if the useful article in which it is 
embodied would be equally useful without [the pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural feature].”174 Although almost identical to the Barnhart test, 
Goldstein’s test replaces the Barnhart requirement that the artistic 
features be “wholly unnecessary”175 to functionality with the 
requirement that the utilitarian function be “equally useful” without the 
artistic features.176 
Although adopted by the district court177 and the dissent in Pivot 
Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products,178 which this Note 
addresses in Section IV.B, Goldstein’s test is flawed in at least two 
critical ways. First, as the majority in Pivot Point recognizes, 
Goldstein’s test comes too close to requiring physical separability to 
achieve copyright protection for artistic elements of useful articles.179 
Second, and more egregious given the evolution of the law, the phrase 
“work of art traditionally conceived”180 in Goldstein’s test reintroduces 
subjective determinations of artistic merit that Congress explicitly 
removed from the Copyright Act181 and that the Copyright Office 
subsequently eliminated from its regulations.182 Unfortunately, 
Goldstein’s test allows judges’ personal biases and opinions of the 
nature of the work to enter the determination of whether a useful article 
is copyrightable, which would likely have a disproportionately harmful 
                                                                                                                     
 173. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, § 2.5.3.1(b); see also Bishop, supra note 142, at 1085; 
Broaddus, supra note 167, at 508. 
 174. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, § 2.5.3.1(b). 
 175. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985).  
 176. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, § 2.5.3.1(b); see also Bishop, supra note 142, at 1085. 
 177. See Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833 (N.D. Ill. 
2001), rev’d and remanded, 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 178. See Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 933–34 (7th Cir. 
2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting) (explaining that Professor Goldstein’s test is a reasonable 
interpretation of the conceptual separability required by the Copyright Act).  
 179. See id. at 924 (majority opinion) (explaining that when applied alone, Goldstein’s test 
is “tied too closely to physical separability” and does not follow “Congress’ determination that 
artistic [features that are] conceptually [separable] from . . . utilitarian design” can qualify for 
copyright protection); see also Broaddus, supra note 167, at 509.  
 180. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, § 2.5.3.1(b). 
 181. Compare Act of July 8, 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-230, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 
(1870), with Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-34, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076–77 (1909) 
(repealed 1976) (eliminating the “fine arts” requirement of the previous Copyright Act).  
 182. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949) (removing the “fine arts” requirement from the 
Copyright Office regulations in compliance with the Copyright Act of 1909). 
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impact on useful articles that often incorporate modern or abstract art 
rather than “traditional” art.183  
The test that this Note advances avoids requiring physical 
separability and instead tests conceptual separability. Furthermore, it 
does not require that the separable artistic features be “works of art as 
traditionally conceived” as Goldstein’s test requires.184 The proposed 
test recognizes that modern and abstract artistic features of useful 
articles are just as entitled to copyright protection as traditional artistic 
features. By focusing on an ordinary, reasonable observer’s perception 
of the work rather than the work’s status as “traditional art,” the 
suggested test does not discriminate against modern or abstract art.  
B.  The Seventh Circuit: Pivot Point—A Hybrid of Second Circuit 
Approaches 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the 
issue of conceptual separability in Pivot Point, another case involving 
mannequins, and arrived at yet another test for conceptual separability 
by combining two prominent Second Circuit tests.185 The Pivot Point 
mannequin at issue in the case was made for hair stylists and 
beauticians to practice and display their work and, according to its 
creator, captured the “hungry look” of high-fashion models.186 Pivot 
Point obtained copyright registration for the design of the mannequin 
and, upon discovering that Charlene brought a strikingly similar 
mannequin to the market, sued for copyright infringement.187 
The district court applied Professor Goldstein’s test for conceptual 
separability and determined that the mannequin could not be 
copyrighted because “even though one can conceive of [the mannequin] 
as a sculpture displayed as art, it would not be equally useful if the 
features that Pivot Point want[ed] to copyright were removed.”188 On 
appeal, Pivot Point argued that the conceptual separability inquiry 
should focus on whether the article was a “work of art,” as Pivot Point 
asserted its mannequin was.189 However, Charlene requested that the 
Seventh Circuit affirm the district court’s application of Professor 
Goldstein’s test.190  
 
                                                                                                                     
 183. See Keyes, supra note 85, at 139. 
 184. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, § 2.5.3.1(b). 
 185. Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004).  
 186. Id. at 915.  
 187. Id. at 915–16. 
 188. Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833 (N.D. Ill. 
2001), rev’d and remanded, 372 F.3d at 917. 
 189. Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 923.  
 190. Id.  
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The Seventh Circuit rejected each of these proposed tests—Pivot 
Point’s preferred “work of art” test because it required judicial 
evaluation of artistic merit and Professor Goldstein’s test for being “tied 
too closely to physical separability.”191 For guidance in determining 
what test to apply, the Seventh Circuit thoroughly reviewed the 
evolution of the conceptual separability doctrine in the Second 
Circuit192 and adopted a test that synthesized two precedents from that 
circuit:  
Conceptual separability exists, therefore, when the artistic 
aspects of an article can be “conceptualized as existing 
independently of their utilitarian function.” Carol Barnhart, 
773 F.2d at 418. This independence is necessarily informed 
by “whether the design elements can be identified as 
reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised 
independently of functional influences.” Brandir, 834 F.2d 
at 1145.193  
Applying this process-oriented test to the mannequin at issue, the 
court found that the features of Pivot Point’s mannequin could be 
conceptualized as existing independently from the mannequin’s use in 
hair and makeup training because they were the result of the designer’s 
artistic judgment.194 The court noted that the designer’s artistic 
judgment was unconstrained by functional considerations and that he 
“had carte blanche” to implement the “hungry look” vision however he 
saw fit.195 Because the court found that the mannequin “was the product 
of a creative process unfettered by functional concerns,” the court held 
that the sculptural features of the mannequin were conceptually 
separable from its utilitarian function and thus entitled to copyright 
protection.196 
The Pivot Point majority made a commendable effort to survey and 
synthesize the myriad of tests used to determine conceptual 
separability.197 Despite its valiant effort, the hybrid test that Pivot Point 
adopted has been criticized as having many of the same flaws as the 
Brandir test,198 the prominent test that Pivot Point incorporates.199 In his 
                                                                                                                     
 191. Id. at 924. 
 192. Id. at 924–30. 
 193. Id. at 931.  
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 931–32 (explaining that Pivot Point only requested that the mannequin designer 
create the “hungry look” of runway models and did not give any specific dimensions or 
measurements that would be required to satisfy functional concerns). 
 196. Id. at 932.  
 197. See id. at 924–30 (providing in-depth analysis of Second and Fourth Circuit 
conceptual separability jurisprudence); Byron, supra note 88, at 188. 
 198. See Byron, supra note 88, at 188. 
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dissenting opinion in Pivot Point, Judge Michael Kanne criticized the 
majority’s process-oriented approach for being inconsistent with the 
Copyright Act, which “looks to the useful article as it exists, not to how 
it was created.”200 Judge Kanne believed that congressional intent 
required that the article itself, not the process of creating the article, 
determine conceptual separability and, ultimately, copyrightability.201 
Others have agreed with Judge Kanne’s criticism of the process-
oriented approach because the design process of a useful article will 
inevitably be influenced by functional considerations, at least to some 
extent.202 Given that reality, the Pivot Point test would nearly 
categorically prevent useful articles from being granted copyright 
protection.203  
The Seventh Circuit’s adoption of a process-based test for 
conceptual separability is inconsistent with the Copyright Act and the 
reality of the design process of useful articles. Therefore, instead of 
examining the artist’s process of creating the work, this Note’s proposed 
test comports with the Copyright Act and its legislative intent by 
focusing exclusively on how an ordinary, reasonable observer views the 
final work and its features.  
C.  Professor Nimmer’s Marketability Standard 
Professor Nimmer advanced the most unique test for conceptual 
separability, determining copyrightability based on the marketability of 
the work.204 Specifically, his test finds conceptual separability “where 
there is any substantial likelihood that even if the article had no 
utilitarian use it would still be marketable to some significant segment 
of the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities.”205 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has adopted Professor Nimmer’s 
“marketability test” in the limited context of clothing design,206 but 
courts have not otherwise adopted it as a general test for conceptual 
separability.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 199. See supra notes 155–72 and accompanying text. 
 200. Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 933–34 (Kanne, J., dissenting) (adding that “it simply is 
irrelevant to inquire into the origins of [the work’s artistic features]”). 
 201. Id. at 934. 
 202. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:144 (2014) (pointing out that 
“obviously” the “design of a useful article is influenced by being the design of a useful article”); 
see also Keyes, supra note 85, at 137. 
 203. See Keyes, supra note 85, at 137. 
 204. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 120, § 2.08(B)[3].  
 205. Id. 
 206. Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging 
that, despite its weaknesses, it was the best test available for the factual situation of clothing 
design).  
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Nimmer himself admitted that his test “is itself not altogether 
satisfactory,” primarily because it is difficult to prove.207 Nimmer’s 
marketability test is also a strange concept for copyright law since 
copyright is usually focused on the work itself, not its success in the 
marketplace.208 As a result, the marketability test is likely to favor more 
conventional or mainstream forms of art at the expense of modern or 
abstract works.209 In his dissent in Barnhart, Judge Newman recognized 
this inequity and explained that some works, even if recognized as 
works of art by a majority of people, would not be copyrightable under 
Nimmer’s test if only a few people—less than some “significant 
segment of the community”—would be willing to purchase those works 
for display in their own homes.210  
As a practical matter, the term “significant” lacks a quantitative 
threshold, and the term “community” is also unclear in scope.211 It is 
unclear if the community would be based on geographic region, 
patronage of the arts, or some other variety of factors.212 In either case, 
under this test, the same work might be deemed protectable based on its 
market success in one community but denied protection based on its 
lack of popularity in another community with different tastes. 
The test for conceptual separability that this Note proposes 
incorporates Nimmer’s marketability test into one of its factors. The 
third factor of the proposed test, marketability information, allows the 
fact-finder to consider facts about the marketability of the work that 
indicate that an ordinary, reasonable observer could perceive aesthetic 
features separate from the article’s function. Marketability information 
can objectively instruct on how an ordinary, reasonable observer 
perceives the artistic aspects of the work but should not control the 
copyrightability determination. Therefore, marketability is incorporated 
as a factor of the proposed test where it can contribute to, but not 
dominate, the analysis.  
V.  PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING TESTS FOR CONCEPTUAL 
SEPARABILITY  
The current state of conceptual separability analysis is in dire need 
of reexamination and simplification. With no guidance on the issue 
                                                                                                                     
 207. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 120, § 2.08(B)[3]; Denicola, supra note 39, at 734 
(emphasizing the evidentiary problems facing any model focusing on consumer judgments and 
motivations).  
 208. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 120, § 2.08(B)[3]; see also Byron, supra note 88, at 
180 (noting that success in the marketplace is an unconventional way to determine 
copyrightability).  
 209. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 120, § 2.08(B)[3]; Keyes, supra note 85, at 136.  
 210. See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(Newman, J., dissenting); see also Byron, supra note 88, at 180. 
 211. See Byron, supra note 88, at 180. 
 212. See id.  
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from the Supreme Court since Mazer v. Stein213 in 1954, the Circuit 
Courts of Appeal and legal scholars have created and modified a 
multitude of tests for conceptual separability. This Note has discussed 
the eight major tests for conceptual separability,214 but variations of the 
eight major tests and other less influential tests also exist.215 With each 
decision in this area, there is a possibility that the court will articulate 
additional tests, especially given the tendency of dissenting judges to 
propose a different test than the majority adopts.216  
Absent from the cacophony of these multiple tests is any 
consideration of the need for consistency or reliability among the 
designers and creators of useful articles. Depending on which test is 
applied, the very same article may be deemed copyrightable by one 
court and not copyrightable by another. The doubt surrounding whether 
a work will be eligible for copyright protection raises concern for 
designers and creators of useful articles.217 The uncertainty that the 
multitude of inconsistent tests for conceptual separability creates 
unfairly prejudices designers and creators of useful articles. Artists, 
authors, and musicians who create more traditional copyrightable works 
are not similarly prejudiced because the copyrightability of their works 
is much more predictable.218  
Most importantly, many of the tests for conceptual separability have 
strayed too far from their intended purpose––to determine if, as the 
Copyright Act requires, the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features can 
be “identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”219 The explicit 
focus of this inquiry is on the final work and its features.220 Neither the 
Copyright Act, the Act’s legislative history, nor the Copyright Office 
regulations make reference to the process of creating the work as a way 
to determine conceptual separability.221 However, two of the leading 
                                                                                                                     
 213. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 214. See supra Parts III–IV.  
 215. By one count, the number of tests for conceptual separability is ten. See Broaddus, 
supra note 167, at 504.  
 216. See, e.g., Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 934 (7th Cir. 
2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 
1151 (2d Cir. 1987) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. 
Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting).    
 217. For example, if copyright protection for their works is unpredictable, designers of 
useful articles might be discouraged from developing new works for fear that they would have 
no recourse against unauthorized copying. See Keyes, supra note 85, at 136.  
 218. The usual requirement for copyright protection of non-useful articles is that the work 
be an original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a) (2012).  
 219. Id. § 101.  
 220. See id. 
 221. See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976); 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960).  
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tests for conceptual separability, the Brandir test in the Second Circuit 
and the Pivot Point test in the Seventh Circuit, both erroneously place 
the focus of conceptual separability analysis on the process of creating 
the work rather than the features of the work itself.222  
This misplaced focus is not only inconsistent with the statutory 
formulation of the Copyright Act; it also has the detrimental effect of 
unnecessarily complicating the conceptual separability analysis. By 
requiring inquiry into the designer’s artistic influences, decisions, and 
processes, these process-based tests invite problems of proof.223 
Moreover, the tests create the risk that the ultimate decision of 
copyrightability will turn on events in the designer’s process rather than 
the conceptual separability of the features of the final work itself. 
Refocusing on whether certain features of the final work can be 
“identified separately” from and are “capable of existing independently” 
of the utilitarian function would likely simplify the conceptual 
separability analysis into a more manageable inquiry and make the 
analysis more consistent with the Copyright Act.224  
Other leading tests are flawed because they use a much more 
rigorous test for conceptual separability than the Congress who created 
the Copyright Act likely intended by effectively applying a standard of 
only physical, and not conceptual, separability.225 The Copyright Act’s 
legislative history clearly states that artistic features either “physically 
or conceptually” separable from the utilitarian function of the article are 
copyrightable.226 Therefore, any test that requires physical separability 
necessarily goes beyond this legislative intent and into a more rigorous 
requirement for copyrightability of useful articles. Despite this plain 
language in the Act’s legislative history, the tests applied in Barnhart 
and by Professor Goldstein come too close to exclusively requiring 
physical separability.227  
Most of the key tests for conceptual separability also run afoul of a 
general principle of copyright law—that judges should not be involved 
in subjective determinations of artistic worth. The U.S. Supreme Court 
established this principle over 100 years ago in Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co.,228 and numerous other courts have embraced and 
                                                                                                                     
 222. See supra notes 155–72, 193–203 and accompanying text.  
 223. See, e.g., Perlmutter, supra note 15, at 375. 
 224. Id. at 346 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1957)).  
 225. See, e.g., supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
 226. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (emphasis added).  
 227. See supra notes 97–108, 173–79 and accompanying text. 
 228. 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained 
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, 
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).  
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echoed it in conceptual separability cases.229 Some authors have 
criticized Judge Newman’s ordinary, reasonable beholder standard, the 
Brandir designer’s influence standard, Professor Goldstein’s “equally 
useful” test, and the Pivot Point hybrid approach for violating the 
Bleistein mandate to keep judges out of the business of art critiquing.230  
Finally, the existing tests for conceptual separability do not provide 
the fact-finder with enough guidance on how to make the separability 
determination that each test requires. Particularly, the Kieselstein-Cord 
and Barnhart tests have been criticized for introducing new terminology 
to the test for conceptual separability but failing to define or thoroughly 
explain that new terminology.231 By nature, any test for conceptual 
separability is abstract—at least to a certain extent. However, providing 
the fact-finder with objective factors to guide their analysis could 
reduce confusion in this area.  
An improved test for conceptual separability would: give designers 
of useful articles guidelines for determining if their work is 
copyrightable; comport with the Copyright Act and its legislative intent; 
align with general concepts of copyright law; and be easily applied in 
court to determine copyrightability in infringement and invalidity 
litigation. 
VI.  PROPOSED TEST FOR CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY   
In short, this Note’s proposed test for conceptual separability is 
whether an ordinary, reasonable observer can perceive aesthetic features 
separate from the article’s function. In applying this test, the factors that 
the fact-finder may consider fall into three main categories: (1) 
objective indicia of public perception; (2) use of the work separate from 
function; and (3) marketability information. This reasonable observer 
standard with objective guiding factors addresses many of the problems 
facing the current state of conceptual separability for copyright of useful 
articles. 
The key determination of the proposed test for conceptual 
separability is whether the ordinary, reasonable observer can perceive 
aesthetic features separate from the article’s function. This test is similar 
to the tests Judge Newman proposed in his dissent in Barnhart232 and 
                                                                                                                     
 229. See, e.g., Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 
2004) (“[T]his approach [that] necessarily involves judges in a qualitative evaluation of artistic 
endeavors [is] a function for which judicial office is hardly a qualifier.”); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. 
Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 423 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The need for 
the inquiry [as to the nature of art] is regrettable, since courts must not become the arbiters of 
taste in art or any other aspect of aesthetics.”). 
 230. See supra notes 136, 167, 180–83, 198 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 86–88, 103–06 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Winter proposed in his dissent in Brandir233 in that all three 
involve the ordinary, reasonable observer standard. However, the 
suggested test for conceptual separability is closer to Judge Winter’s 
test than Judge Newman’s test because it does not require complete 
temporal displacement of the utilitarian function by the aesthetic 
features. The proposed test only requires that the ordinary, reasonable 
observer perceive aesthetic features separate from the article’s function, 
not that the reasonable observer perceive the aesthetic features at a time 
when the observer is not contemplating the functional features. Under 
the proposed test, aesthetic features perceived simultaneously with the 
utilitarian function in the mind of the ordinary, reasonable beholder 
would satisfy the conceptual separability inquiry. By forgoing the 
complete temporal displacement requirement of Judge Newman’s 
test,234 the suggested test avoids criticism directed at other tests for 
approaching physical separability and being more rigorous than the 
Copyright Act intended.235 
Of course, the ordinary, reasonable observer does not decide cases; 
the fact-finder does. Under the proposed test, the fact-finder will make 
the conceptual separability decision based on a hypothetical ordinary, 
reasonable observer’s perception of the work. Since the conceptual 
separability determination is abstract by nature, even under the 
proposed test, the following factors should guide the fact-finder: (1) 
objective indicia of public perception; (2) use of the work separate from 
function; and (3) marketability information. These factors should not be 
treated as independent requirements for conceptual separability. Rather, 
they are guidelines that the fact-finder should analyze and balance when 
considering conceptual separability.   
The first factor aiding the fact-finder in determining if an ordinary, 
reasonable observer could perceive aesthetic features separate from the 
article’s function is the objective indicia of public perception of the 
work. Criteria to consider under this factor include whether the work is 
displayed in art museums or galleries, whether the work’s artistic 
features, rather than its utilitarian function, have garnered recognition 
by the public or media, and whether the work is otherwise presented for 
public viewing. If these and related questions indicate that ordinary 
members of the public can perceive the article’s artistic features 
separate from the article’s function, then this first factor weighs in favor 
of finding conceptual separability.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 233. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1151 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 234. See Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 423 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
 235. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.  
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The second factor of the suggested test for conceptual separability is 
use of the work separate from its function. Under this factor, the key 
question for the fact-finder is whether, and to what extent, the work has 
an alternate use as a work of art apart from its utilitarian function. 
Indications that the work does have an alternate use exclusively as art 
include instances of individuals displaying or using the work in a 
manner for which it is entirely nonfunctional, collecting quantities of 
the work beyond the quantity necessary for utility, displaying the work 
after the utilitarian function is either broken or removed, and displaying 
and considering the work as art. This second factor weighs in favor of 
conceptual separability if these considerations about usage of the work 
indicate that an ordinary, reasonable observer can perceive the article’s 
artistic features separate from the article’s function.  
The third and final factor to consider in the proposed test for 
conceptual separability is marketability information. This factor is 
designed to help the fact-finder determine if facts about the 
marketability of the work indicate that the ordinary, reasonable observer 
could perceive aesthetic features separate from the article’s function. 
Relevant facts to consider under this factor include to what extent the 
work would be marketable to consumers, even if the work had no 
utilitarian use; to what extent the work is advertised and marketed based 
on its artistic features; and whether consumers indicate that aesthetic, 
rather than functional, concerns dictated their purchase of the work. 
Marketability information indicating that the work’s artistic features, 
separate from the article’s function, influenced ordinary consumers to 
purchase the article weighs in favor of finding conceptual separability. 
These three factors, and the considerations related to each, may be 
presented with the aid of survey responses and expert testimony, and 
courts should generally allow this type of evidence. These factors 
should not be applied as a rigid three-part test where the absence of 
evidence relating to one factor necessarily precludes a finding of 
conceptual separability. Rather, these factors should be treated as 
guidelines for determining the ultimate question of whether the 
ordinary, reasonable observer could perceive aesthetic features separate 
from the article’s function. 
The proposed ordinary, reasonable observer test with guiding factors 
is a good test for conceptual separability because it is designed to be 
consistent with copyright and other areas of law. Tort law and criminal 
law both successfully rely on the reasonable person standard for many 
key determinations.236 Copyright law uses the ordinary, reasonable 
observer standard to decide similar conceptual issues of copyright law, 
                                                                                                                     
 236. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965); 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 
§ 27 (15th ed. 2014); see also Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1062 
n.75 (2014) (discussing other uses of the “reasonable person” standard).  
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including whether an allegedly infringing work is “substantially 
similar” to an allegedly infringed copyrighted work.237 Factors play a 
prominent role in other areas of copyright law as well—most notably 
the four ubiquitous fair use factors.238  
Finally, and most importantly, the proposed test and its associated 
factors solve the problems facing the existing tests for conceptual 
separability. First, it closely comports with the Copyright Act and its 
legislative intent. Rather than focusing on the designer’s process of 
creating the work, the suggested test properly focuses on the work itself. 
The factors give designers, at the time of creation, and courts, at the 
time of litigation, guidance in determining if the aesthetic aspects are 
conceptually separable from the functional features of the work and are 
therefore copyrightable. The suggested test is not based on artistic merit 
and does not invite the fact-finder to make subjective determinations of 
aesthetic worth. Instead, the proposed test instructs the fact-finder to 
carefully observe the work and consider the existence and relative 
weight of all the factors to objectively determine if an ordinary, 
reasonable observer could perceive aesthetic features separate from the 
article’s function. Finally, the proposed test and associated factors have 
strong intuitive appeal. At its most basic level, the proposed test echoes 
Mazer and says that artistic features of useful articles that an ordinary 
observer can view as separable are entitled to copyright protection. This 
approach is consistent with the Copyright Act, its legislative intent, and 
the general principles of copyright law.  
Returning to the treepot example from the Introduction, the proposed 
test would let the fact-finder answer the critical question of whether an 
ordinary, reasonable observer can perceive aesthetic features separate 
from the treepot’s tea-holding function. The test would not allow the 
fact-finder to make determinations regarding the artistic worth of the 
treepot or investigate the designer’s process and motivation for creating 
the work. Instead, the test would require the fact-finder to focus on the 
work itself and consider the three factors and the relevant considerations 
of each. Of course, the parties would put on evidence going to each of 
the three factors: (1) objective indicia of public perception; (2) use of 
the work separate from function; and (3) marketability information. If, 
on balance, these factors weighed in favor of determining that an 
ordinary, reasonable observer could perceive aesthetic features separate 
from the treepot’s function, those aesthetic features would be 
copyrightable. 
                                                                                                                     
 237. See PATRY, supra note 202, § 9:81. 
 238. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  
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CONCLUSION 
The numerous existing tests for conceptual separability have made 
copyright protection of useful articles an exceedingly difficult area of 
copyright law. Confusion surrounding the proper test for conceptual 
separability discourages innovation by designers of useful articles and 
leads to inconsistent results across different courts. With consumer 
demand pushing for aesthetically pleasing useful articles, today more 
than ever, utilitarian works increasingly reflect both aesthetic and 
functional concerns. Given that reality, courts need a test for conceptual 
separability that is consistent with the Copyright Act, offers more 
predictability to designers of useful articles, and is easily applied.  
The test for conceptual separability that this Note 
proposeswhether an ordinary, reasonable observer can perceive 
aesthetic features separate from the article’s functionaddresses the 
problems currently facing conceptual separability and brings much 
needed simplification to this area of copyright law. Most importantly, 
the proposed test is consistent with the Copyright Act and its legislative 
intent. Moreover, the three factors associated with the proposed test—
objective indicia of public perception, use of the work separate from 
function, and marketability information—provide guidance typically 
lacking in the existing tests for conceptual separability. If the Supreme 
Court acts to resolve the inconsistent application of conceptual 
separability amongst the Circuit Courts of Appeal, it should adopt this 
Note’s proposed ordinary, reasonable observer test and its 
corresponding guiding factors. 
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